FOUNDED BY A SMALL GROUP OF PHILOSOPHERS OVER A GREY NEW JERSEY WEEKEND IN APRIL 2003, THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH GROUP FOSTERS COLLABORATIVE INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON MORALITY in the mind, brain, and behavior. THE GROUP NOW NUMBERS OVER 40 HUMANISTS AND SCIENTISTS FROM UNIVERSITIES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. SINCE OUR INCEPTION, MEMBERS HAVE CONTRIBUTED THOUSANDS OF PUBLICATIONS TO THE EVER-GROWING LITERATURE ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY.
THE PEOPLE: below WE Introduce OURselves and the moral Psychology Interests that brought US together.
Jana Schaich Borg, PhD is an Associate Research Professor at Duke’s Social Science Research Institute. She is also the Director of Duke’s Master in Interdisciplinary Data Science Program, co-Director of Duke’s Moral Attitudes and Decision-Making Lab, and co-Director of Duke’s Moral Artificial Intelligence Lab. Dr. Jana Schaich Borg uses neuroscience, computational modeling, and emerging technologies to study how we make social decisions that influence, or that are influenced by, other people. As a neuroscientist, she employs neuroimaging, ECOG, simultaneous electrophysiological recordings in rats, and 3-D videos to gain insight into how humans and rodents make social decisions. As a data scientist, she develops new statistical approaches to analyze these high-dimensional multi-modal data in order to uncover principles of how the brain integrates complex social information with internal representations of value to motivate pro-social actions.
Daryl Cameron is an assistant professor of psychology at Penn State, where he is also a core faculty member in the Rock Ethics Institute. He received his Ph.D. from UNC Chapel Hill, and his B.A. in Philosophy and Psychology from the College of William & Mary. He completed a summer post-doctoral appointment in the Duke University Kenan Institute for Ethics. His research has been funded the National Science Foundation, Templeton Foundation, UCLA Animal Law Program, and the Penn State Social Science Research Institute. Much of Daryl’s work focuses on understanding empathy and compassion—why do people often lack empathy, compassion, and generosity in response to mass suffering (i.e., “compassion collapse”) and during intergroup conflicts. In this work, Daryl focuses on testing motivational factors that can shape people’s decisions of whether to empathize. In other work, Daryl examines implicit and emotional factors that shape moral decision-making, with projects including studies of implicit moral attitudes; applying constructionist theories of the mind to understand moral emotions; and assessing the social and ethical ramifications of moral outrage. Daryl hosted the Moral Psychology Research Group meeting at Penn State in fall 2017, and loves a good conversation over coffee about philosophy and psychology.
Fiery Cushman is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard University, where he directs the Moral Psychology Research Laboratory. His research investigates the cognitive mechanisms responsible for human moral judgment, along with their development, evolutionary history and neural basis. It also explores the computational basis of human decision making. He received his BA and PhD from Harvard University, where he also completed a post-doctoral fellowship. He served as Assistant Professor of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences at Brown University from 2011 to 2014.
John M. Doris is Peter L. Dyson Professor of Ethics in Organizations and Life, Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, and Professor, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University. He works at the intersection of cognitive science, moral psychology, and philosophical ethics, and has authored or co-authored papers for such venues as Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Scientific American, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Cognition, Bioethics, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Journal of Research in Personality, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Doris has been awarded fellowships from Michigan’s Institute for the Humanities; Princeton’s University Center for Human Values; the National Humanities Center; the American Council of Learned Societies; the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; the National Endowment for the Humanities; and is a winner of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology’s Stanton Prize for excellence in interdisciplinary research. He authored Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, 2002) and Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency (Oxford, 2015), and with his colleagues in the Moral Psychology Research Group wrote and edited The Moral Psychology Handbook (Oxford, 2010). He is currently working on a collection of his papers, Character Trouble: Undisciplined Essays on Moral Agency and Personality, for Oxford University Press and, with Manuel Vargas, is editing The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Before joining the Cornell faculty, Doris taught in the Philosophy Departments at the University of Michigan and the University of California, Santa Cruz, and in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis. His pedagogy has been recognized with awards at both the undergraduate and graduate level.
Jesse Graham received his PhD (Psychology) from the University of Virginia in 2010, a Master’s (Religious Studies) from Harvard University in 2002, and a Bachelor’s (Psychology) from the University of Chicago in 1998. He is George S. Eccles Chair in Business Ethics, Associate Professor of Management, Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, where he hovers menacingly over the Values, Ideology, and Morality Lab. His research interests are in the moral, ideological, and religious convictions that cause so much conflict and yet provide so much meaning to people’s lives. He is particularly interested in how ideological and moral values shape behavior outside of conscious awareness, and in how these effects vary across individuals and cultures.
Joshua Greene is Professor of Psychology and a member of the Center for Brain Science faculty at Harvard University. His research interests cluster around the intersection of psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. His early work focused on the cognitive neuroscience of moral judgment and the interplay between emotion and reason in moral dilemmas. More recent work focuses on critical features of individual and collective intelligence. His current neuroscientific research examines how the brain combines concepts to form thoughts and how thoughts are manipulated in reasoning and imagination. His current behavioral research examines strategies for improved social decision-making and the alleviation of intergroup conflict. Other interests include effective altruism and the social implications of advancing artificial intelligence. He is the author of Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.
Gilbert Harman is James S. McDonnell Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He is the author or co-author of nine books, including Explaining Values (Oxford, 2000) and (with Sanjeev Kulkarni) Reliable Reasoning (MIT, 2007), and An Elementary Introduction to Statistical Learning Theory (Wiley, 2011). He has edited or co-edited four others, including Conceptions of the Human Mind (Erlbaum, 1993).
Dr. J. Kiley Hamlin is an Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of British Columbia, and holds a Tier 2 Canada Research Chair in Developmental Psychology. She received her doctorate from Yale University in 2010, and her undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago in 2005. Her work explores the earliest developmental origins of the human moral sense, by examining precursors to moral cognition and action in preverbal infants. She is currently an Associate Editor at Cognition. She was inducted into the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society of Canada in 2018. Recent awards include the Stanton Prize from the Society for Philosophy and Psychology for significant early career contributions to Psychology and Philosophy, the Janet Taylor Spence Award for Transformational Early Career Contributions to Psychological Science, and a Killam Research Prize.
Daniel Kelly’s research interests lie at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, moral theory, and evolution. He is the author of Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust, and has published papers on moral judgment, social norms, responsibility, racial cognition, cross-cultural diversity, and David Foster Wallace. He is a founding member of the Moral Psychology Research Group, which includes like-minded philosophers and psychologists investigating morality from both philosophical and empirical perspectives. He regularly teaches Introduction to Philosophy and Philosophy of Mind, and has also taught courses on norms and moral theory, the philosophy of biology, the evolution of human cognition, the conceptual foundations of cognitive science and psychiatry, individualism and identity, and the moral psychology of climate change. He was recently a Mellon Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He likes a good argument.
Joshua Knobe is Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and Linguistics at Yale University. Most of his research is in the new field of experimental philosophy. In his work in this field, he has conducted experimental studies about people’s intuitions concerning intentional action, causation, consciousness, group agency, racial prejudice, reason, explanation, freedom, and moral responsibility. Above all, he is interested in the ways in which moral considerations can affect people’s judgments about what seem to be purely scientific questions.
Victor Kumar is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. Previously, he held postdoctoral research fellowships in the Philosophy Departments at the University of Toronto and the University of Michigan. Kumar received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Arizona in 2013 and was a visiting fellow at Harvard University and Joshua Greene’s Moral Cognition Lab in 2011/12. He has published in Ethics, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, and Synthese. His research lies at the intersection of ethics and cognitive science.
Tamar Kushnir is an Associate Professor of Human Development and director of the Early Childhood Cognition Laboratory at Cornell University and is co-director of Cognitive Science @ Cornell. She received her M.A. in Statistics and a PhD in Psychology at UC Berkeley, and was a Post-Doctoral fellow at the University of Michigan. Kushnir has served as an associate editor at Child Development and Cognitive Science, and currently serves on the boards of the Society of Philosophy and Psychology and the Cognitive Development Society. Kushnir’s research examines mechanisms of learning and conceptual change in young children with a focus on how early learning accounts for the variability in our beliefs about the social, moral, and psychological causes of action. Kushnir’s work is motivated by a curiosity about a range of questions central to understanding human morality, including: how we develop beliefs in causation, free will, and moral agency, why and how we trust what others tell us, how we learn to distinguish idiosyncratic preferences from social group norms, and whether (and from what age) imagination about what is possible and permissible explains motivation and decision making.
Edouard Machery is Distinguished Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (University of Pittsburgh-Carnegie Mellon University), and an Adjunct Research Professor, Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by psychology and cognitive neuroscience with a special interest in concepts, moral psychology, the relevance of evolutionary biology for understanding cognition, modularity, the nature, origins, and ethical significance of prejudiced cognition, the foundation of statistics, and the methods of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He is also involved in the development of experimental philosophy, having published several noted articles in this field. He is the author of Doing without Concepts (OUP, 2009) and Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (OUP, 2017) as well as the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (OUP, 2012), La Philosophie Expérimentale (Vuibert, 2012), Arguing about Human Nature (Routledge, 2013), and Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (Routledge, 2014). He is also the editor of the Naturalistic Philosophy section of Philosophy Compass since 2012.
Ron Mallon is Professor and Chair in the Department of Philosophy and and Director of the Philosophy–Neuroscience–Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis. He has written or co-authored papers in Cognition, Ethics, Journal of Political Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, Noûs, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Social Neuroscience, Social Philosophy, and Social Theory and Practice. He is the author of The Construction of Human Kinds. His research is in social philosophy, philosophy of cognitive psychology, and moral psychology, with a special focus on human categories.
Victoria McGeer is a professor in the Philosophy Department and a Research Scholar in the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.
Alfred Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of twelve books, including Effective Intentions (2009), Free: Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will (2014), andManipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility (2019), and over 200 articles and the editor or co-editor of six books. He is past director of the Big Questions in Free Will project (2010-13) and the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control project (2014-17) – multi-million dollar projects featuring collaborative research by scientists and philosophers. Mele’s primary philosophical interests are in various aspects of human behavior.
Maria Merritt is a Core Faculty member of the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics and Associate Professor in the Department of International Health at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, with a secondary appointment in the Department of Philosophy at the Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences. She earned her B.S. in Biology from Wake Forest University, her B.A. in Philosophy and Modern Languages from the University of Oxford, and her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Berkeley. Merritt completed post-doctoral training in the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health. Prior to joining the faculty at Johns Hopkins, she taught philosophy at the College of William and Mary and held a Faculty Fellowship at the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics at Harvard University. At Johns Hopkins, Merritt is a faculty affiliate and advisory board member of the Johns Hopkins-Fogarty African Bioethics Training Program. Her current research interests include global health ethics, international research ethics, moral philosophy, and moral psychology. Merritt’s work as an author or co-author includes articles published in AIDS, American Journal of Public Health, Bulletin of the WHO, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Ethics, JAMA, Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, PLoS Medicine, and Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics.
John Mikhail is an Associate Dean of Transnational Legal Study and professor at Georgetown Law. His research interests include tors, criminal law, constitutional law, international law, jurisprudence, moral and legal philosophy, legal history, and law and cognitive science. He received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cornell University and was a Lecturer and Research Affiliate in the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences at MIT. He received his J.D. from Stanford University.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (Ph.D.) is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at the College of Charleston (Charleston, SC). He is also an affiliate member of the psychology department and a roster faculty member in the neuroscience program. Professor Nadelhoffer specializes in the philosophy of mind and action, moral psychology, and the philosophy of law—which were the focus of his research during his time as a post-doctoral fellow with the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project (2009-2011). He recently edited The Future of Punishment (Oxford University Press, 2013) and co-edited Neurointerventions and the Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity (Oxford University Press, forthcoming) and Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
Eddy Nahmias is Professor of Philosophy and an associate member of the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University, where he has initiated programs in neurophilosophy and neuroethics. His research is devoted to the study of human agency: what it is, how it is possible, and how it accords with scientific accounts of human nature. His primary focus is the free will debate. He is co-editor of Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings.
Shaun Nichols is Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University. He works at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science, and his research concerns the psychological underpinnings of philosophical thought. He is the author of Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment and Bound: Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility, as well as several articles in academic journals in philosophy and psychology.
Laura Niemi is an Assistant Professor at University of Toronto in the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Director of the Applied Moral Psychology Lab. She is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at Cornell University. She completed postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard and Duke, and received her Ph.D. in Social Psychology and Social Neuroscience at Boston College. Laura studies the intersection of moral psychology, cognitive science, and psycholinguistics. Her papers have appeared in journals including Psychological Science, Psychological Inquiry, and Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin.
Lauren Olin is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri – St. Louis, where she is also a member of the Center for Neurodynamics. She earned her BA in Philosophy at McGill University in Montreal, and her PhD in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program at Washington University in St. Louis. Most of her current research is focused on the philosophy of humor and the psychology of comic judgment. Broader interests include the philosophy of cognitive science, value theory, epistemology, perception, and the philosophy of psychiatry.
Jonathan Phillips is an assistant professor in cognitive science at Dartmouth College. Before that, he was a postdoctoral fellow in the psychology department at Harvard University and completed his Ph.D. in philosophy and psychology at Yale in 2015. His research has focuses on the psychological representation of possibilities, moral judgment, causal reasoning, semantics, and theory of mind. In studying these aspects of cognition and their intersection, he draws on tools from philosophy, psychology, computer science, and linguistics.
Alexandra Plakias is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. Her research concerns moral psychology, metaethics, and the intersection of the two. She has published papers on moral disagreement and moral relativism, and on the role of disgust in moral judgment.
Jesse J. Prinz is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. His research focuses on the perceptual, emotional, and cultural foundations of human psychology. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perception Basis (MIT, 2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford, 2004), The Emotional Construction of Morals(Oxford, 2007), Beyond Human Nature (Penguin, 2012), The Conscious Brain (Oxford, in press) and Works of Wonder: A Theory of Art (Oxford, in production). All of his research in the cognitive sciences bears on traditional philosophical questions. Prinz’s work is a contemporary extension of the classical empiricist tradition in philosophy, which emphasizes experience, rather than innate knowledge, and disembodied, amodal representations in thought.
Joshua Rottman is Assistant Professor of Psychology and Scientific & Philosophical Studies of Mind at Franklin & Marshall College, where he directs the Developing Moral Values Lab. He received a B.A. in Cognitive Science from Vassar College in 2008 and a Ph.D. in Psychology from Boston University in 2015. Josh’s research lies at the intersection of social cognitive development and moral psychology. His work primarily focuses on children’s acquisition of moral beliefs, the role of disgust in moral judgment, and cognitive precursors of environmentalism. He has published in a range of peer-reviewed journals, includingPsychological Science, Cognition, Emotion, and Child Development.
Adina Roskies is the Helman Family Distinguished Professor at Dartmouth College, Professor of Philosophy and chair of the Cognitive Science Program, and an affiliate of the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. She received a Ph.D from the University of California, San Diego in Neuroscience and Cognitive Science in 1995, a Ph.D. from MIT in philosophy in 2004, and an M.S.L. from Yale Law School in 2014. Prior to her work in philosophy she held a postdoctoral fellowship in cognitive neuroimaging at Washington University with Steven Petersen and Marcus Raichle, and from 1997-1999 was Senior Editor of the neuroscience journal Neuron. Dr. Roskies has received numerous awards and fellowships, including the Stanton Prize from the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, The Neuroethics Prize from the Italian Society of Neuroethics, a Mellon New Directions fellowship, and fellowships from the Princeton Center for Human Values and the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Philosophy of Science. She was recently awarded grants from the NIH through the BRAIN Initiative, and the Templeton Foundation. Dr. Roskies’ research interests lie at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience, and include philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and ethics. She has coauthored a book with Stephen Morse, A Primer on Criminal Law and Neuroscience, and is recent past president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
Timothy Schroeder received his B.A. from the University of Lethbridge and his Ph.D. from Stanford University. After starting his career at the University of Manitoba, he is now Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University. He works on the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and these interests intersect in his book, Three Faces of Desire (Oxford, 2004). He also has a forthcoming book with Nomy Arpaly, In Praise of Desire.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Philosophy Department and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He is also core faculty in the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences and Duke’s Center for Cognitive Neuroscience. He received his BA from Amherst College in 1977 and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1982. Walter has served as vice-chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association and co-director of the MacArthur Project on Law and Neuroscience. He and Felipe De Brigard will organize a series of Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy in 2016-2018, funded by the John Templeton Foundation. Walter publishes widely in normative moral theory, meta-ethics, applied ethics, moral psychology and neuroscience, philosophy of law, epistemology, informal logic, and philosophy of religion. He has defended atheism, consequentialism, contrastivism, limited moral skepticism, and irresolvable moral dilemmas. His current research focuses on empirical moral psychology and neuroscience (including experiments on psychopaths and on the diversity of moral judgments) and on the implications of neuroscience for the legal system and for free will and moral responsibility (including the responsibility of addicts and people with mental illnesses, including scrupulosity).
David Shoemaker is a professor in the Department of Philosophy & Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University, as well as a recurring visiting professor in the Gothenburg/Lund Responsibility Project at the University of Lund. He is the author ofResponsibility from the Margins (OUP 2015), an associate editor at the journal Ethics, the general editor of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, and the co-editor of the long-running ethics blog PEA Soup. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on moral emotions, personal identity and ethics, and agency and responsibility.
Chandra Sripada is the Co-director of the Neuroimaging Methods Core in the Department of Psychiatry and an Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Psychiatry at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He received his B.A. from the University of Texas, Austin, his M.D. from the University of Texas Medical School, Austin, and his Ph.D. from Rutgers University.
Stephen P. Stich is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University and Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. Prior to joining the Rutgers faculty in 1989, he taught at the University of Michigan, the University of Maryland and the University of California, San Diego. Stich has lectured in more than 30 countries around the world and has been Visiting Professor at a number of leading universities in the USA, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea. His publications include seven books and thirteen co-edited anthologies on issues in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, moral theory, and philosophical methodology. Stich is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and was the first recipient of the American Philosophical Association’s Gittler Award for outstanding scholarly contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences. In 2007, he received the Jean Nicod Prize sponsored by the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
Nina Strohminger is Assistant Professor of Legal Studies & Business Ethics at the Wharton School and was previously a Fellow at the Yale School of Management. She has studied morality as it intersects with emotion, identity, and social behavior. Her papers have appeared in Psychological Science, Science, and Cognition. In her free time, Nina hangs out with philosophers.
Valerie Tiberius is the Paul W. Frenzel Chair in Liberal Arts and the chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Minnesota. Her work explores the ways in which philosophy and psychology can both contribute to the study of well-being and virtue. She is the author of The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits(Oxford 2008), Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge 2015), and Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: How We Can Help Others to Live Well (Oxford, 2018). She has published numerous articles on the topics of practical reasoning, prudential virtues, well-being, and the relationship between positive psychology and ethics, and has received grants from the Templeton Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. She served as President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association from 2016-17.
Kevin Tobia is a postdoctoral fellow in the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich and NYU School of Law. He received a Ph.D. in philosophy and J.D. from Yale and B.Phil. (Master’s in philosophy) from Oxford. His research is primarily in experimental legal philosophy, or “experimental jurisprudence.” In this work, he has conducted experimental studies about legal interpretation and concepts of legal significance, such as reasonableness, consent, intentional action, causation, motive, natural kind concepts, identity, and the self.
Manuel R. Vargas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on the overlap of moral, psychological, and legal issues concerning human agency and freedom. He also writes about Latinx and Latin American philosophy, especially the history of Mexican philosophy. His account of free will and moral responsibility, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (OUP, 2013), won the American Philosophical Association’s Book Prize in 2015, an award given every two years for the best book in philosophy by a younger scholar. In 2004, he was a recipient of the first American Philosophical Association Prize in Latin American Thought. Vargas is also co-author, with John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, and Derk Pereboom, of Four Views on Free Will (Blackwell, 2007), and with Gideon Yaffe, he co-edited Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman (OUP, 2014).
Natalia Washington is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. Previously she was a McDonnell postdoctoral scholar in the Philosophy Neuroscience and Psychology program at Washington University in St. Louis. She is interested in externalist perspectives in philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science, and in understanding the ways in which minds and environments interact, her current research focuses on the theoretic and conceptual foundations of mental health and human nature in the philosophy of psychiatry. She has also done work on implicit bias and moral responsibility, and on the effects of implicit cognition on medical industry interaction with doctors and medical students.
Liane Young is Associate Professor of Psychology at Boston College and director of the Morality Lab. Her research investigates social and moral cognition, with a focus on moral judgment and impression updating, using methods from social psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including fMRI and TMS. Young received her Ph.D. in psychology from Harvard University in 2008, and her B.A. in Philosophy from Harvard University in 2004. She is the recipient of the 2018 Psychonomic Society Early Career Award, 2017 APS Janet Taylor Spence Award, 2017 Sage Young Scholars Award (SPSP), and the 2016 Stanton Award from the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. She serves on the editorial boards of Psychological Science, Cognition, Cognitive Science, and Scientific Reports.